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TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY
VOL. 33 NO. 4

SUMMER 1960

GENERAL RULES DETERMINING THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY LAWS:
AFTER TWENTY YEARS AN UNSOLVED PROBLEM
THOMAS F. BRODEN, JR.t

(Continued from Spring Issue)
PROPOSED TREASURY REGULATIONS

The present statutory language-"the usual common law rules"
-is based upon the Status Quo Resolution of 1948. The relevant
part of that Resolution provided that the term "employee" in the social
security laws should not include "(1) any individual who, under the
usual common-law rules applicable in determining the employeremployee relationship, has the status of an independent contractor or
(2) any individual (except an officer of a corporation) who is not an
employee under such common-law rules." "' To understand the
meaning of the present statutory language one must study the governmental battle from which the Status Quo Resolution emerged. This
battle pitted the Congress against the Executive-particularly the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Treasury Department. Congress
fought as guardian of the common law and defender against bureaucratic tyranny, symbols capable of stirring emotions and inflaming
passions. The Executive did battle as champion of the Supreme Court
and protector of the public interest, equally gallant causes. The central
issue was often shrouded in a cloud of exaggerated advocacy. Two
facts, essential to an understanding of the subject, often became lost in
the imbroglio. The first fact is that there is not and never was a single,
simple, clear-cut common law definition of the employer-employee relationship. The second is that the Congress, the Executive and the
Supreme Court were in basic agreement as to the classification of all
but a small fraction of the working force in America. It was the
t Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
105. P.L. 642, 80TH CONG., 2ND SESS. (1948).
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borderline occupations which were at issue in the battle. Too often
these basic facts were all but forgotten in the melee.
The Sarajevo came on November 26, 1947, when The Commissioner of Internal Revenue proposed new regulations defining the
employer-employee relationship for the purpose of Social Security
taxation. 10 6 It was expressly stated in the proposal that the new regulations were in conformance with "the principles enunciated in 'United
States v. Silk' (1947) 67 S. Ct. 1463; 1947 Int. Rev. Bull., No. 15,
at 36, 'Bartels et al. v. Birmingham et al.,' 1947, 67 S. Ct. 1547; 194
Int. Rev. Bull. No. 15, at 43, and related cases." Whereas the then
existing regulations, promulgated in 1936, emphasized the "control"
factor, the proposed regulations emphasized "dependency" and the
"economic realities" of the situation, which latter terms soon became
congressional curse words. The proposed regulations stated at the outset that "The relationship of employer and employee for the purposes
of the Social Security legislation * * * is not restricted by the technical
legal relation of 'master and servant', as the common law had
developed that relation in all its variations * *

vided:

"

They then pro-

107

An individual performing services for a person is generally
an employee of such person unless he is performing such services
in the pursuit of his own business as an independent contractor.
In most cases in which an individual renders services to a person,
general understanding and usage make clear the status of that
individual either as an employee of such person or as an independent contractor. * * *

Obvious examples of employees and independent contractors were then
listed. There is no doubt that Congress and the Supreme Court would
have agreed with these classifications. And these lists covered the vast
majority of the working force that were potentially subject to social
security coverage."'
Part (b) of the regulations provided the test for determining in
borderline cases whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor. It was there that the "dependency" and "economic
reality" tests were enunciated. The significance of each of these factors 109 including the "control" factor was then explained in detail.
106. 12 FED. REG. 7966 (1947).

107. 12

FED. REG.

7966 (1947).

108. Other groups not listed, such as farm workers and farm operators, comprised a large segment of the working force but were expressly excluded from
coverage.
109. Degree of control, permanency of relation, skill required by the individual
in facilities for work and opportunities of the individual for profit or loss.
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Whereas the then existing regulations emphasized the "control" factor,
the proposed new regulations only grudgingly admitted its significance.
After indicating that the higher the degree of control the greater likelihood that an employer-employee relationship was present, the regulations stated:
* * * Although control is characteristically associated with the
employer-employee relationship, determination of whether, as a
matter of economic reality, an individual is an employee of the
person for whom he is performing services, or is an independent
contractor, is not to be made solely on the basis of control which
such person may or can exercise over the details of such services.
(Italics supplied.)
In a backhanded way, however, the italicized clause is an admission
that the "control" test is the generally decisive rule. This is certainly
true of the non-borderline cases.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF STATUS

Quo

RESOLUTION

Shortly after the new regulations were proposed, Status Quo Resolutions designed to nullify them were introduced in both houses of
Congress. H.J. Res. 296 was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Gearhart, from California, on January 15, 1948
and was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. On January
30, 1948, Senator Butler, from Nebraska, introduced an identical resolution, S.J. Res. 180, whereupon it was referred to the Senate Finance
Committee. Except for one notable exception, the Administration assumed a posture of direct opposition to both the resolutions. The official
statement of the Treasury Department to the House Ways and Means
Committee on H.J. Res. 296,1n stated that the resolution "would substitute the 'common-law rules' for the principles of economic reality
recently set forth by the Supreme Court, * * *."

Although without

intending to do so, the Administration was inviting Congressional
critics to put an extreme interpretation on the proposed new regulations.
This, of course, is what happened. The House Ways and Means
Committee report on the Status Quo Resolution"' portrays the proposed regulations as a complete abandonment of common law principles
whereas "The legislative history of the 1939 amendments * * * shows
conclusively that the Congress intended the usual common-law rules in
determining whether an individual is an employee." And in debate on
the floor of the House, proponents of the measure followed the same
110. H. Ra'T. 1319, 80TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 13 (1948).
Ill. H. REPT. 1319, 80TH CONG., 2ND SESS. (948).

TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33

tack." 2 In a way the opponents of the Status Quo Resolution contributed to the portrayal of the proposed regulations as assaults on the
revered common law by castigating the phrase "the usual common law
rules" as indefinite and uncertain." 3
The resolution was pushed through the House with remarkable
speed. It was introduced in the House on January 15th and referred
to the Committee on Ways and Means. This speed was undoubtedly
due to the fact that the Committee made the agencies aware that the
resolution was to be processed swiftly." 4 The Committee Report on
the resolution was filed in the House on Tuesday, February 3rd and two
days later the Rules Committee, after hearing three members of the
Committee on Ways and Means, granted a rule on the resolution. On
February 27th it was called up, debated and passed the House by a
vote of 275 to 52. This was indeed expeditious action. Most members
of the House thought they were defending the honor of the revered
common law and striking a blow in defense of liberty against bureaucratic tyranny and judicial autocracy.
In the Senate the same general approach was evident. The proposed regulations were viewed and generally condemned as a departure
from sacred common law moorings. However, in contrast to the
dominant view in the House," 5 the Senate practically exonerated the
Supreme Court from any wrongdoing in the matter. This is extremely
important in relation to the current question of the vitality and authority of the Silk, Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham cases. The general
view in the Senate was that these cases did not justify the vast changes
proposed by the agency regulations and that, properly interpreted, they
were a correct appraisal of the law.
The Treasury Department, undoubtedly somewhat shaken by the
swift and stunning defeat administered in the House, resumed the
battle in the Senate. By this time the propaganda efforts of the Administration were beginning to be felt. The Administration depicted
itself not only as the defenders of the Supreme Court in this matter but
also as guardians of the public interest. According to the Administration from one-half to three-quarters of a million persons would be deprived of Social Security benefits if the Status Quo Resolution were
This is particularly true of the remarks
112. 94 CONG. Rc. 1893-1904 (1948).
of Representative Gearhart on pages 1863-1895 of Volume 94 of the CONGRESSIONAL
REcoRD.

113. 94 CONG. REC. 1897-1998 (1948).
114. See debate on HJ. Res. 296 by Congressman Eberharter, 94 CONG. REc.

1898 (1948).

115. Exceptions were Representative Mills, Democrat from Arkansas, 94 CONG.
(1948) and a brief filed by Representative Reed, Republican from New
York, 94 CONG. REc. 1899-1902 (1948).

REc. 1903
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passed. Proponents of the resolution were stung by this claim and
fought back. Much of the Congressional discussion in the hearings
and debates was directed to this somewhat collateral but, from a partisan political point of view, potent issue.
The Administration's position was that under the tests announced
in the Silk, Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham cases these groups
should always have been covered. From the inception of these laws
the Federal Security Agency had been doing this. It was crediting
toward benefits these groups with quarters of coverage even though
the Treasury Department, following a narrower interpretation, was
not collecting taxes from the persons themselves or from their employers." 8 Some members of the Senate Finance Committee were surprised to hear that the Federal Security Agency was crediting and
paying benefits to persons from whom and for whom no social security
tax collection had been made."' This information supplied by Mr.
Ewing conclusively demonstrated that the resolution as passed by the
House was definitely not, as labelled, a "Status Quo Resolution".
On May 6, 1948, the Committee favorably reported H.J. Res.
296 to the Senate. In its report the Finance Committee maintained
the Congressional posture first as guardian of the common law ...and
as defender against bureaucratic tyranny." 9 In addition the Senate
Finance Committee came forth as champion of a fresh cause. Not
only was the Federal Security Agency seeking to "make law" by "unbounded and shifting" regulations but also it was dissipating "the old
age and survivors insurance trust fund through benefit payments to
persons, not 'employees' under the act, who have not, therefore, made
contributions to the trust fund." This last charge must have been a
bitter one for the Federal Security Agency to hear. In testimony
before the Senate Finance Committee representatives of the agency went
to great lengths to point out to the committee that eligibility for social
security benefits was not based upon tax contributions to the trust fund
but rather depended upon whether a person was in covered employment.
The agency pointed out instances where by order of court benefits were
paid even though tax contributions had not and could not retrospectively
be made. 20 Furthermore, the agency representatives had indicated to
116. Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, 80TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 126,

135 (1948).
117. Hearings before Senate Finance Committee, 80TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 140
(1948).
118. SEN. REPT. No. 1255, 80TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 1 (1948).
119. SEN. REPT. No. 1255, 80TiH CONG., 2ND SEss. 8 (1948).
120. Hearings before Senate Finance Committee in H.J. Res. 296, 80TH CONG.,
2ND SESS. 141 (1948).
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the committee that the credit toward benefits had been awarded by the
agency without tax contributions because of a difference of interpertation of the statutory term "employee" by the Treasury Department and
the Federal Security Agency and that in the end the Supreme Court
had sustained its rather than the Treasury's interpretation.
However, the most striking feature of the Senate Finance Committee Report is its attitude toward the Supreme Court decisions in
the Silk, Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham cases. Whereas the
House Committee Report assailed these decisions, the Senate Report
did not. The Senate Report confined its fire exclusively to the administrative agencies. It indicated that the Supreme Court decisions
in the above cases, when properly understood, represented an accurate
interpretation of the Social Security laws.' 2' According to the Report
the administrative agencies had seized upon "prefatory remarks of the
Court" relating to "economic dependence" and "economic reality" to
justify their new proposed regulations. This, it states, was completely
unwarranted. "Rather than implementing the Supreme Court decisions, the proposed Treasury regulation attempts to surmount, supersede and negative them." 122 The Report points out that these prefatory
remarks must be understood in the light of "the facts involved, the
decision, and to their moving rules." In three of the four situations
presented for decisions in these cases the Court upheld the taxpayers
and held the agencies had sought erroneously to extend under existing
regulations coverage beyond the terms of the Act. According to the
Report, this indicates the Court had no intention of making any of the
sweeping expansions in the coverage of the Act proposed by the new
regulations. On the contrary says the Report the Court was merely
indicating that the common law tests should not be narrowly applied;
they should be "realistically applied". Out of an abundance of caution,
however, the Report concludes this discussion with the reservation that
if its interpretation of the Supreme Court cases is wrong and that of
the agencies is right, then the Status Quo Resolution is not to be interpreted as consistent with the cases but as a restoration of the usual
common-law rules realistically applied.
This same approach was followed by Senator Milliken in explaining H.J. Res. 296 on the floor of the Senate. 2 ' He directed his fire
against the Treasury Department for seeking to make law by regulation and the Federal Security Agency for dissipating the trust fund. 24
121. SEN. REPT. No. 1255, 80TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 13-17 (1948).
122. SEN. REPT. No. 1255, 80TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 17 (1948).
123. 94 CONG. REc. 7021-7026 (1948).
124. 94 CONG. REC. 7021-7026 (1948).
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He absolved the Supreme Court of any wrongdoing in the Silk,
Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham cases with a caveat that if others
interpret these cases to support the agencies then the Resolution is
inconsistent with the cases. In debate Senator Milliken reemphasized
the position of the Senate Finance Committee that these cases stood
for a "realistic application" of the common law rules-not a repudiation
of them.' 25 Even Senator Hatch who led the opposition to the Resolution in the Senate agreed that the Supreme Court had not abandoned
the common-law test. However, he pointed out that, in the words of
Justice Rutledge, "The assumed simplicity and uniformity resulting
from 'Common law standards' does not exist". For this reason he
doubted the value of the Resolution which proclaimed that the "usual
common-law rules" were to apply. As to the Treasury Department
regulations, he said that if they were unwarranted under the Social
Security laws, the Courts could be relied upon to invalidate them.'2
The consideration of H.J. Res. 296 was complicated in the Senate
by the fact that an amendment increasing benefits under the old age
assistance, aid to dependent children, and aid to the blind provisions in
the Social Security laws was attached to it. Senators Barkley and
Pepper complained that this confused the issue because they favored
these increased benefits but opposed the Resolution. 27 In any event
the Resolution was passed by the Senate by the overwhelming margin
of 74-6.128 On the same day the House concurred in the Senate
amendments and sent the Resolution to the White House. But the
explanation of the measure on the House floor by Representative Reed
of New York is extremely important. He abandoned the earlier approach of the House Ways and Means Committee which had condemned the Supreme Court decisions in the Silk, Greyvan, and Bartels
v. Birmingham cases. 2 9 Instead, he adopted the interpretation of these
decisions put forth by the Senate Finance Committee and Senator
This same approach was followed on both the House and
Milliken.'
Senate floors when the Resolution was passed over President Truman's
veto.' 8 '
The legislative history clearly establishes that the dominant Congressional opinion was that H.J. Res. 296 was a restatement of the law
7021-7026 (1948).

125. 94

CONG. REc.

126. 94

CONG.

REc. 7026-7029 (1948).

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

CONG.

RZEc. 7124-7127 (1948).

94
94
94
94
94

7134 (1948).
7214 (1948).
REc. 7214 (1948).
REc. 8087-8093, 8188-8191 (1948).

CONG. REC.

CONG. REc.
CONG.
CONG.
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and was consistent with the Silk, Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham
cases.
In 1949 the Truman Administration urged Congress to repeal
the Gearhart or Status Quo Resolution and extend coverage, as employees, to the 500,000 to 750,000 persons in the occupational groups
which would have been covered if the Resolution had not been enacted. 13 2 A congressional compromise gave the Administration some
of the extension of coverage it asked but rejected the requested repeal of
the Resolution. The terminology of the Resolution was retained as
part of a new definition of "employee". The new definition also provided specific coverage, as employees, for many of the occupational
groups in- question. In retaining the "usual common law rules" provision the Conference Committee stated: 13'
With regard to the meaning of the phrase the usual common law
rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship,
this opportunity is taken to reiterate and endorse the statement
made in the Report of the Committee on Ways and Means in connection with the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939:
A restricted view of the employer-employee relationship should
not be taken in the administration of the Federal old-age and
survivors insurance system in making coverage determinations.
The tests for determining the relationship laid down in cases
relating to tort liability and to the common-law concept of master
and servant should not be narrowly applied (p. 76).
This statement made in 1939 is equally applicable to the phrase in
the bill as agreed upon in the conference agreement, which contemplates a realistic interpretation of the common law rules.
This was part of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1950,1'4 the
main provisions of which extended coverage for the first time to the
self-employed. Consequently over 500,000 of the persons in the
occupational groups in question were covered as employees and the
remainder were covered as self-employed persons. The House would
have gone further than the Senate in accommodating the Administration. The House version of the bill 15 would have covered as employees all the occupation groups in question. In addition it would
have incorporated in its new definition of "employee" the six test
factors the 1947 Treasury regulations proposed. However, the
132. Hearings before House Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 2893, 81ST
CONG., 1ST SESS. Part 2 1087-1088 (1949).
133. H. REPT. No. 2771, 8 1ST CONG., 2ND SESS. 104 (1950).

134. 64 STAT. 477 (1950).
135. H. REPT. No. 1300, 81ST CONG., 1ST SESs. 81-91. (1949).
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Senate version eliminated these factors and many of the occupational
groups.'8 6 In conference three of the occupational groups eliminated
by the Senate were restored. This resulted in coverage, as employees,
for over half a million workers. However, the Treasury regulations
factors were not restored.
That part of the definition of "employee" which originated in the
Gearhart or Status Quo Resolution and which makes the common law
rules applicable has remained unchanged since the 1950 Amendments
Act. The meaning of this clause is to be found in the legislative history
of the above Resolution. This history makes perfectly clear that the
Resolution was not intended to upset the Silk, Greyvan and Bartels v.
Birmingham interpretations of the word "employee". Therefore for
the purpose of guidance in the interpretation of this term, these cases
are good law today.
THE STATUS

Quo

RESOLUTION:

OF THE

1947

A

RESTATEMENT OR REPUDIATION

SUPREME COURT CASES

One of the avowed purposes of the Gearhart or Status Quo
Resolution was to achieve a higher degree of certainty in the law. 18 7
It has not had that effect however. This is not too surprising. The
shifts in interpretation during legislative consideration of the Resolution, the hedging in the Committee Reports on the effect of the Resolution on the 1947 Supreme Court cases and the general lack of precision
of the language of the Resolution, all pointed to uncertainty rather than
clarity. First the ever present variations in views as to the content of
the "usual common law rules applicable to the employer-employee
relationship" persist. Some courts view the rules as being exclusively
concerned with the factor of control-"the common law control test".
On the other hand others think the common law rules indicate that
control is one among a number of relevant factors. Second there is a
wide difference of opinion as to the effect of the 1948 Resolution on
the 1947 Supreme Court cases. Some view the Resolution as a direct
and complete repudiation of the cases. In complete contradiction others
-notably Judge Clark of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
-view the Resolution as a codification and restatement of the law of
the 1947 cases. In many other cases the courts appear to ignore the
Resolution completely while others ignore the 1947 cases entirely.
After twenty-two years the basic test for determining the employer136. SEN. R~ET. 1669, 81ST CONG., 2ND SESS. 95-97 (1950).
137. 94 CONG. REc. 1894 (1948).
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employee relationship under the Social Security laws remains uncertain
and unclear.
Before examining the cases subsequent to the enactment of the
Status Quo Resolution a word of caution should be repeated. It is
almost impossible to know how much the announced rule of law has to
do with the result in a case. A judge may be disposed to find that cab
drivers or commission salesmen are independent contractors no matter
how the rule of law is verbalized. For him this is going to be the
result whether the rule as he sees it establishes control as the exclusive
factor or merely one among many factors to be considered and whether
the 1948 Resolution repudiates or codifies the 1947 Supreme Court
cases. As was said earlier, this impotence of rules of law in close cases
(which means most of the civil cases that get before the courts) is not
confined to Social Security cases. It is an inherent characteristic of
the judicial process which must be kept in mind as we analyze these
cases lest we overemphasize the effect of variations in the rules of laws
on the outcome of cases. This is not to say that a different understanding of the rule would never affect the outcome. In some cases every
38
indication is that it would.'

The first Court of Appeal to consider the impact of the Status
Quo Resolution was the Fourth Circuit in the case of Ewing v.
Vaughn,131 in which Vaughn who was drawing Social Security benefits
at the time sought review of the decision of the Appeals Council of the
Social Security Administration reducing his benefits. The Appeals
Council had held his activity as a "flour broker" to be "employment"
requiring the reduction of his Social Security benefits in accordance
with the amount of wages he earned as such an "employee". Judge
Prettyman, speaking for himself and Judges Parker and Dobie, said
the reasoning of the Appeals Council was based on the concept of "economic reality" as developed in the 1947 Supreme Court cases and that
the 1948 Resolution calling for the common law test reversed that view.
Judge Prettyman said that the factors of control, provision of tools
and a place to work are all part of the common law definition and
dictate that Vaughn is not an employee. The effect of this case is to
identify the 1947 Supreme Court cases with the "economic reality
concept" and to indicate that the cases so understood were repudiated
by the 1948 Resolution.
In December of that same year the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held coal jobbers (persons who unload and store coal
138. Metropolitan Roofing Co. v. U.S., 125 F. Supp. 670 (Mass. 1954).

139. 169 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1948).
Supp. 20 (Ark. 1948).

See Crossett Lumber Co. v. U.S., 79 F.
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into customers' bins) to be employees and subject to Social Security
taxes.""0 Judge Woodrough observed that Silk and Bartels v. Birmingham must be read in the light of the 1948 Status Quo Resolution. He
alluded to a number of factors in addition to control such as irregularity
of employment, payment per ton unloaded and stored, and use of own
tools. Finally he cited and quoted from the 1945 case of Grace v.
Magruder,4 ' for the proposition that according to common law principles as well as the purposes of the Social Security laws coal jobbers
were employees. One is left with the impression that Judge Woodrough
believed the 1947 Supreme Court cases had departed from the common
law principles which were then restored by the Status Quo Resolution
but on this point the opinion is cryptic and ambiguous.
The following year three additional circuits interpreted the Status
Quo Resolution as repudiating the principles of the 1947 Supreme Court
cases. Judge Major, in a Seventh Circuit case, 142 thoroughly examined
the incidents in the development of the term "employee" in the Social
Security laws. He noted the early agency regulations, the abortive
effort of the Board to secure Congressional expansion of the term in
1939, the 1947 Supreme Court cases and finally the legislative history
of the 1948 Status Quo Resolution. He read the Resolution as a
repudiation of the Silk case. Even so the factors that he apparently
considered relevant to determine whether the cab drivers were or were
not employees included a number of factors enumerated in the Silk
case, namely, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities,
permanency of relation, and control. On the basis of these, he held
the drivers to be independent contractors. Judge Swygert dissented
in a well-reasoned opinion stressing the point that many factors are
relevant and must be weighed. Four months later the Fifth Circuit also
held cab drivers not to be employees in an opinion adopting the position
that by the Status Quo Resolution Congress "rebuked the overzeal of
the courts in trying to make a better law than the words of Congress
had made." 143 Approximately, two weeks after the Seventh Circuit
decided the Party Cab Co. case, the Tenth Circuit " joined the swelling
ranks of courts of appeals interpreting the Status Quo Resolution as
repudiating the 1947 Supreme Court cases. In that case the court
held an outside commission salesman to be an independent contractor.
140.
141.
142.
(1949).
143.
144.

U.S. v. Kane, 171 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1948).
148 F.2d 679, cert. den., 326 U.S. 720 (D.C. 1945).
Party Cab Co. v. U.S., 172 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1949); 24 N.D. LAw. 578
New Deal Cab Co. v. Fahs, 174 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1949).
Benson v. Social Security Board, 172 F.2d 682 (1949).
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The first reported case taking a position contrary to these five
circuits is Shreveport Laundries v. U. S. 4 5 in which District Judge
Porterie held a laundry pick up station operator to be an independent
contractor and said:
In our decision of this case we are not considering that the passage
by Congress of the [Status Quo Resolution] subsequent in time
to the [Silk and Bartels v. Birmingham] decisions is a rejection of
the doctrine of the Supreme Court established in the two cases.
This decision by Judge Porterie of the Fifth Circuit was handed down
at about the same time the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
deciding that the Resolution had the effect of repudiating these decisions.
Significantly enough in a subsequent case 146 Judge Porterie recanted
and adopted the orthodox (in the Fifth Circuit) position that Silk,
Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham rejected common law tests and
that Congress repudiated these opinions with the Status Quo Resolution. Also whereas in the Shreveport laundries case a number of factors
including control were analyzed, in the Rambin case the factor of control
was emphasized to the exclusion of all others.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit continued its ambiguous and cryptic treatment of the effect of the 1948 Resolution on the
1947 Supreme Court decisions. In Dimmitt-Richhoff-Bayer Real
Estate Co. v. Finnegan,47 certain real estate salesmen were held to be
independent contractors as to whom no Social Security tax liability
applied. In his opinion Judge Sanborn cited the Silk case as a controlling authority. Later he indicated that the Status Quo Resolution was
directed at the ill-starred Treasury Regulations proposed for adoption
on November 27th, 1947. Still later he concluded that the Resolution
was aimed at "Treasury Regulations or court decisions relaxing or
changing the common law concept of the employer-employee relationship." 148 It is not clear whether Judge Sanborn considered the 1947
Supreme Court cases to be such eroneous "court decisions."
In the face of this almost unanimous interpretation by the other
circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Com. Shows v. Higgins 49 adopted a diametrically
opposed position. In a split decision written by Judge Clark and joined
by Augustus Hand, Clark said that the Gearhart or Status Quo Resolu145. 84 F. Supp. 435 (La. 1949).
146. Rambin v. Ewing, 106 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. La. 1952).

147. 179 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1950).
148. 179 F.2d 882, 888.
149. 189 F.2d 865 (2nd Cir. 1951).
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tion was, in effect, a codification or restatement of the 1947 Supreme
Court cases not a repudiation of them. Judge Clark summarized the
background of the enactment of the Status Quo Resolution-the 1947
Supreme Court cases and then the proposed new Treasury regulationsaccurately observing that "the so called Gearhart Resolution-was
specifically directed at this new regulation." And to many in Congress
the "issue [was] one of legislative preservation of the integrity of its
own enactments against bureaucratic expansion."
At issue in the case was the status of circus performers who were
denominated independent contractors in their contracts. Judge Clark
said that the circus had the power of discharge, that payment was for
agreed upon sums per week so that there was no element of profit and
loss for the performers and that although the circus exercised little
control over the detail of acts performers presented, it nevertheless had
the ultimate power of direction and control as to where the entire circus
played and how the acts were fitted into one integrated show. Evaluating all relevant factors, he held the performers to be employees properly
the subject of Social Security tax liability.
Judge Swan dissented on the grounds that, in his opinion, the
1948 amendment repudiated the 1947 Supreme Court cases and restored the common law control test as enunciated in Radio City Music
Hall.15 In this case the circus lacked the authority to control the
details of the performance therefore the performers were not employees
under the act.
Since the Ringling case, only one new Circuit of the Court of
Appeals has had occasion to consider this subject. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover v. Stockholders Publishing
Co. 5' held newspaper route district men and dealers, who were the
conduit through which papers passed from the publisher to the carrier
boys, to be employees and properly the subject of Social Security tax
liability. In his opinion Judge Walsh said that a "realistic application
150. Radio City Music Hall v. U.S., 135 F.2d 715 (2nd Cir. 1943). Although
Judge Clark's views as to the continuing vitality of the 1947 Supreme Court cases
have never been directly challenged by any subsequent Second Circuit opinion, the
case of Zipser v. Ewing, 197 F.2d 728 (2nd Cir. 1952), presents a curious inconsistency
with the reasoning of the Ringling opinion. In Zipser, Judge Frank's opinion, joined
by Judges Augustus Hand and Clark himself, cites the Status Quo Resolution, and
the Radio City Music Hall case but makes no mention of the 1947 Supreme Court
cases. Judge Frank goes on to say that Ringling is consistent with Radio City Music
Hall on the point "that it is the right to direct which is important." However Judge
Frank does not mention that Ringling, unlike Radio City Music Hall, also considers
many other factors in addition to control to be important. Pointing more toward
Ringling is the 1957 case of Ben v. U.S., 241 F.2d 127 (2nd Cir. 1957) in which a
one paragraph per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
cites as authority the Silk, Bartels v. Birmingham, Ringling, and Westover cases.
Significantly enough Zipser is not mentioned.
151. 237 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1956).
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is to be made of the common law rules * * * and the term 'employment'
and 'employee' are to be construed, not in a restricted case, but so as
to accomplish the purposes of the legislation involved. Those persons
are 'employes' who, as a matter of economic reality, are dependent upon
the business to which they render service." He then enumerated factors
such as risk, control permanency and others he thought would "bear
logically upon the issue of the workers' actual economic dependence upon
the business of the alleged employer". Judge Walsh cited the Silk,
Bartels v. Birmingham and Ringling cases as authority for these general
propositions. He did not discuss the Status Quo Resolution but the
obvious inference is that he agreed with Judge Clark's discussion in
Ringling.
The present position of the Courts of Appeals for the various
circuits may be summarized as follows. The test to determine the
employer-employee relationship in the Tenth Circuit, if not limited to,
certainly gives overwhelming significance to the factor of control over
52 All
the details, methods, manner and means by which work is done.'
other circuits which are on record consider the control factor to be one
of many factors to be evaluated. The Ninth Circuit would point these
factors to the ultimate criteria of "economic dependence" and "economic
reality". 5
The Circuits that have thus far considered the question are split
four (Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth) to two (Second and Ninth)
with one (Eighth) undecided as to whether the Status Quo Resolution
repudiates or restates the principles of the 1947 Supreme Court cases.
The districts courts have generally tended, first to greatly emphasize control of the means of performance as the basic test and second,
to either ignore the Status Quo Resolution or consider it to have
repudiated the principles of the 1947 Supreme Court cases. As we
have seen, a Massachusetts District Court in the First Circuit 1'4 greatly
emphasized control and considered the 1948 Status Quo Resolution to
have been a repudiation of the Silk case. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit has yet to pass upon the question. The same is true of the
Third Circuit where three district courts have adopted the view that the
Resolution repudiated the 1947 Supreme Court cases. In Schmidt v.
Ewing,1 55 a meat inspector was denied Social Security benefits when he
was held not to be an employee because the company had no right to
control the result, means or manner in which he inspected meat. Although paid by the company, he was assigned to the company by the
152.
153.
154.
155.

Benson v. Social Security Board, 172 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1949).
Westover v. Stockholders Publishing Co., 237 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1956).
Metropolitan Roofing Co. v. U.S., 125 F. Supp. 670 (Mass. 1954).
108 F. Supp. 505 (M.S. Pa. 1952).
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State Department of Agriculture, performed his services in accordance
with rules and regulations issued by the Department and reported
regularly to the Department. In Millards Inc. v. U. S. 5 ' siding applicators were held to be independent contractors as to whom the company was not liable for Social Security taxes. As in the two previous
district court cases set out above, the trial judge ascribed the "economic
reality" test to the 1947 Supreme Court cases and then indicated that
this was repudiated by the 1948 Resolution. In this case Judge
Hartshorne went on to say that evidence that applicators did not work
for others, called the company's superintendent "boss", referred inquiries about application jobs to the company and that the company
carries its sign on the job were laregly beside the point because they were
directed to the repudiated Silk and Bartels v. Birmingham test of
dependency as a matter of economic reality. This unwarranted restriction of the probative value of these facts stems from Judge Hartshorne's
belief that the right to control the details and means by which the result
is accomplished is the exclusive factor to be considered. As in the
Metropolitan Roofing Case in Massachusetts dealing with applicators,
if the judge had understood that the proper test called for consideration
of factors other than control, the result in the case might well have been
different.
Some courts have cited the 1947 Supreme Court cases but ignored
the 1948 Resolution completely. 5 7 There is a slight possibility that
these courts were aware of and silently adopted the view that the
Resolution restates the law of the cases but there is nothing in the
opinions of the judges to indicate that this is so.
Some courts have cited the 1947 Supreme Court cases, cited the
Senate Report which accompanied the 1948 Resolution, but made no
mention of the Resolution or its relation to the cases.' 58 Others have
cited the 1948 Resolution while ignoring the 1947 Supreme Court
cases.' 5 9 Others have cited the 1948 Resolution while ignoring the
1947 Supreme Court cases.
156. 146 F. Supp. 385 (D.N.J. 1956).
157. Brady v. Periodical Publishers' Service Bureau, 173 F.2d 776 (6th Cir.
1949), held magazine solicitors and collectors to be independent contractors because
the company "does not control their means and manner of work."
158. Weatherguard Corporation v. U.S., 146 F. Supp. 942 (Ct. of Cl. 1947), held
commission salesmen of storm windows and doors to be employes upon whose employment Social Security taxes had been properly levied. After examining a number
of factors such as control, skill and provision of tools, Judge Jones concluded that
the purposes of the Social Security legislation as disclosed by the Supreme Court
in Silk suggest that the salesmen should be considered employees.
159. In Zipley v. U.S., 156 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Pa. 1957) commission salesmen
and siding applicators were held to be independent contractors and in Willard Storage
Battery Co. v. Carey, 103 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ohio 1952) physicians who, on a parttime basis at the company, treated company personnel were held independent contractors.
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CONCLUSION

The history of the development of the basic rules applicable in
determining the employer-employee relationship under the Social Security laws presents an interesting picture of the operation of our legal
system. It depicts the functions performed by the various processeslegislative, administrative, and judicial-in our law. It shows them at
their best and at their worst-their strengths and their weaknesses.
As it should be in a democracy the legislative process pulls the
heavy oar. For the vast, vast majority of persons the action of Congress, influenced greatly by the legislative recommendations of the
President, determines their Social Security status. When the Social
Security Act came into being by Congressional action upon Presidential
recommendation, most workers had no difficulty determining whether
they were in covered employment or were outside the scope of the law.
Action of Congress had settled their rights and liabilities. Similarly in
1950 the Social Security rights and liabilities of vast numbers of selfemployed persons was conclusively settled by Congressional action authorizing their coverage. At the same time Congress, with one broad
sweep, not piecemeal as in the judicial process, settled the status as
employees of a number of occupational groups-life insurance salesmen,
commission drivers and homeworkers-whose status had been the subject of judicial pulling and hauling for years.
For the vast majority of persons whose status is clear, the administrative process also performs valuable services. On the one hand, it is
the conduit through which the actions of Congress are interpreted and
passed on to the millions of persons throughout the country. On the
other hand, it performs the tremendous bookkeeping and tax collection
jobs whereby benefit eligibility is recorded and tax liability is satisfied.
Those whose status under the law is clear have little need of the judicial
process or the adjudicatory phases of the administrative process.
These processes are important for those whose status is unclearfor those who have legal problems. Immediately after enactment of
the Social Security laws, the Treasury Department and the Social Security Board anticipated some of these problems and, to aid in their
solution, promulgated interpretive regulations. Subsequently, the adjudication phases of these agencies' processes were occupied in determining whether specific individuals in borderline occupation groups were
or were not covered. And the judicial process came into play when the
disappointed parties in the administrative process sought further relief
in the courts. This clearly demonstrates that the basic function of the
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judicial process is to handle disputes which grow out of borderline
problematic situations.
In this study we have seen our various legal processes at their
best and at their worst. If one shares the writer's view that the Social
Security laws are one of the great contributions of the New Deal to the
alleviation of economic distress during old age and unemployment, then
its enactment was one of Congress's finest hours. Similarly the efficient
administration of the vast program by the Treasury Department and
the Social Security Board and its successors is one of the great achievements of our administrative process. And the perception demonstrated
by the Supreme Court in the Silk, Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham
cases is a tribute to the wisdom of our highest judicial organ.
But every closet has its skeletons. The Status Quo Resolution
itself is not the most constructive piece of legislation Congress has
produced. Spawned by a Congressional debate largely devoted to false
issues, it is vague and ambiguous. Its express purpose was to squelch
the proposed new Treasury regulations of 1947. But the case against
the regulations is not nearly so strong when examined with unbiased
hindsight. They were not the seismic break with tradition that Congress charged. In fact if it had been indicated that the proposed regulations were consistent with, rather than an assault upon the common
law, it would be difficult to find fault with them. One cannot help but
suspect that many in the 80th Congress supported the Resolution out
of pent-up rebellion against the New Deal Administration. It was the
first Republican-controlled Congress since the New Deal and since
World War II. It was the Congress which enacted the Taft-Hartley
Act whereby the "pendulum" swung away from the Wagner Act. It
was the Congress which reversed the case of N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications by excluding newsboys from coverage under the federal labor
laws. It was the Congress which proposed the two term Presidential
limit-a clear slap at President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Resolution
was undoubtedly, to many, a further device to whittle the New Deal
bureaucrats down to size. Such venomous spite is Congress at its worst.
But the Administration is not without blame. It should have anticipated the inflammatory nature of an assault on common law traditions.
And when calm reflection reveals that the assault was purely fictitious,
the error appears all the greater. In the judicial process where the
Supreme Court appears to have acquited itself well, many of the lower
federal courts have not been as perceptive. Not only is there widespread confusion in the present law, but also in many cases it is evident
the judges were not aware of basic statutes such as the Status Quo
Resolution and prior decisions such as the Silk case. It must be con-
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cluded that each of the various processes are chargeable with errors in
the development of this area of the law.
As we have said the present status of the law in this area is unclear. The courts have differed widely as to the general principles
applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship. The
Treasury Department continues to use its original 20-year-old formula,
ostensibly relying, for the most part, on the factor of control. While
some judges appear to do the same, most seem to recognize the relevance
of factors other than control. Few, however, have perceived as clearly
as Judge Clark of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Ringling
case, the precise test that the 1947 Supreme Court cases and the 1948
Status Quo Resolution strive to express.
The precise test has been variously verbalized. Justice Reed speaking for the Supreme Court identified a number of factors including
control which are relevant. He also indicated that the overall purposes
of the legislation must be taken into account. The Senate Finance
Committee said that they agreed with Justice Reed's concept, but used
different words to express it. Their verbalization of the test was "the
usual common law rules realistically applied". The important point
that Justice Reed and the committee are striving to make clear and the
point that Judge Clark clearly perceives ...is that the test for the
"employer-employee" relationship under the Social Security laws embraces a number of factors. These include control, opportunity for
profit or loss, amount of investment, and degree of skill required for
the work.
In addition, Justice Reed said that the purposes of the legislation
must be taken into account, a view which might appear inconsistent
with the usual common law rules. However, there is no inconsistency
in, on the one hand, taking into account the purposes of the legislation
and on the other hand consulting relevant common law rules. When a
term is used by a legislative body, its common law background in other
fields of the law (such as vicarious liability in tort) is to a certain extent
known to the legislators. But it is equally true that those who enact
the legislation have a purpose which may occasionally require an interpretation different than the one derived from other legal fields. Therefore, to discern the correct meaning in the particular case the purpose of
the legislation as well as the common law must be taken into account.
Judge Learned Hand makes this point very strikingly in one of
In that case,
the early Social Security cases, Texas Co. v. Higgins.'
Judge Hand said that bulk oil plant distributors appeared to him to
160. 189 F.2,d 865, 869 (2nd Cir. 1951).
161. 118 F.2d 636 (2nd Cir. 1941).
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clearly not be employees even though some tort cases had held that
they were. Hand said that bulk oil distributors may have been considered servants in tort cases because "it should be remembered that a
vital consideration in imposing liability may well have been that the
injured person was likely otherwise to be without any actual remedy." 162 A great judicial wisdom underlies this observation. The
judge and jury always are and should be aware of the realities of the
case before them. The result can never be ignored. The rules of law
must always be tools by which a just result is achieved and consequently this result must always be uppermost in the mind of the judge,
juror or agency official. This is the common law approach at its best.
It is applicable in all areas of the law. In a tort case the judge and
jury must always be aware that recompense and liability depend upon
their understanding of the facts and law. The same is true in Social
Security cases. Benefits and tax liability depend upon the adjudicating
official's understanding of the facts and law. In borderline cases, the
justice of the result, its compatibility with the purpose of the legislation,
will and should be a factor that is evaluated by them. This is the approach of Justice Reed and the Senate Finance Committee. It is the
orthodox common law approach, summed up by the well known common law canon of statutory construction: "Statutes are to be interpreted
in the light of their purpose." 163
The fact that proper interpretation of a statute requires that its
purpose be taken into account leads to a word of caution. Cases like
NLRB v. Hearst Publications164 and U.S. v. Silk 16 are considered
leading cases for the interpretation of the term "employee" in social
legislation. Within limits, this approach is sound. In the group of
cases dealing wtih the term "employee"-Hearst interpreting the
NLRA, Silk interpreting the Social Security laws, Rutherford Food
67
66
Corp. v. McComb,' the FLSA, and Cosmopolitan Co. v. McAllister,1
the Jones Act-Justice Reed cross-fertilized cases dealing with various
statutes. But he did so to indicate the proper interpretive approach,
i.e., the relevance of a number of factors besides control and the significance of the purposes of legislation. Lower federal courts have used
the Social Security cases in a similar manner in litigation involving
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

118 F.2d 636, 639 (2nd Cir. 1941).
3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 153 (Horack, 3rd ed. 1943).
322 U.S. 111 (1944).
331 U.S. 704 (1947).
331 U.S. 722 (1947).
337 U.S. 783 (1949).
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However, the authority of the Social Security cases
other statutes.16
outside the Social Security field, is justifiable only to the extent that
the purposes of the other statutes coincide with the purposes of the
Social Security laws.
At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to discern a common
element in the various factors which the courts and agencies have recognized as relevant in determining the employer-employee relationship.
All of the factors help to determine whether or not the person is in his
own business, whether as Justice Wolfe of the Utah Supreme Court 169
has said, he is engaged in an "independent calling". If he is, then he
is held to be an independent contractor rather than an employee. When
the courts and agencies have followed this approach they would appear
to be more closely attuned to the Congressional purpose of the legislation. This is particularly true today. The recent provision of old
age and survivors insurance for the self-employed makes the concept
of "independent calling" even more akin to the over-all Congressional
purpose behind Social Security legislation. Since 1950, and with certain exceptions, one who carries on a trade or business is covered as
a self-employed person. The clear inference is that one who is not
engaged in a trade or business of his own-not in an "independent
calling"-but who is nevertheless regularly engaged in work of some
kind is to be covered as an employee.
In the main, this seems to be the real, but unarticulated, approach
of the Treasury Department. Schochets when in business for themselves were held to be self-employed 170 whereas when working regu7
larly at a poultry company, they were held to be employees.1 ' A
physician while in residency worked part time for a particular organiza168. F.L.S.A.:
Tobin v. LaDuke, 190 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1951), lumber loaders held employees; Tobin v. Anthony-Williams Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1952),
truck drivers and wood workers held employees; Mitchell v. Strickland Trans.
Co., 228 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955), night watchmen held employees; Mitchell v.
McCarty, 239 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1957), McComb v. Wagner, 89 F. Supp. 304
(E.D.N.Y. 1950), homeworkers held employees, reversed for other reasons 187
F.2d 977 (2nd Cir. 1951).
Unfair Labor Practice:

N.L.R.B. v. Nu Car Carriers, 189 F.2d 756 (3rd Cir. 1951), truck drivers

held employees.
Selective Service Reinstatement:
Plomb Tool Co. v. Sanger, 193 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1952), commission salesmen held independent contractors.
Tort Claims Act:
Strangi v. U.S., 211 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954), brush burner held independent
contractor.
169. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 P.2d 1027, 1029-1045
(1940).
170. REv. RUL. 57-80, CB 1957-1, 324.
171. REv. RUL. 57-79, CB 1957-1, 323.
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2
tion and was held to be an employee during this part time work."
His status was distinguished from a physician in private practice who
worked part time for a particular organization and who had been held
In neither of these examples did the right to
not to be an employee.17
control the means and details of the work reside in the alleged employer.
The real distinction can be found in the "own business" or "independent
calling concepts".
This was the approach of Judge Clark in the Ringling case where
the circus performers, although really not subject to control as to the
means and method of performance, were still not truly in business for
themselves. They worked for the circus. On the other hand, other
lower federal courts have failed to perceive this approach. The rash
of recent cases dealing with siding applicators exemplify this. In these
cases, it is demonstrated that the applicators are really not in business
for themselves. They work for the company that sells the siding. Yet
they have been held not to be employees.
In borderline cases, this "own business" or "independent calling"
test appears to be much more helpful than the "control" test. Indeed
it can be said that both the master-servant tort cases and the Social
Security law cases demonstrate that the general proposition concerning
the right to control is not too helpful in the solution of concrete borderline cases. This is the precise reason why agencies and courts have
resorted to additional factors. Although the right to control will generally be present where an employer-employee relationship exists, this
factor alone is not too helpful in deciding borderline cases. It is interesting to note that Justice Wolfe takes the position that the "independent calling" test is the original and most orthodox common law
rule in determining the employer-employee relationship, and that the
"control" test was a later perversion of the original rule. 7 4 If this be
true, then the development of the law in the Social Security area represents a return to the early, orthodox common law view.

172. REV. RUL. 57-21 CB 1957-1, 317.
173. REV. RUL. 84 CB 1953-1, 404.
174. Justice Wolfe's position is that from antiquity the master has been held
civilly liable for the acts of his servant. At the beginning of the industrial revolution
problem cases began to appear wherein a more remote person hired another, who was
independently set up in business, to do a specific job. Respondeat superior did not
apply to the more remote person because the individual who was hired was engaged
in an "independent calling" and was properly answerable himself for injuries growing
out of work he or his own servants did. Individuals exercising "independent callings"
were "independent contractors". At first courts probed to determine whether the
individual who was hired was actually engaged in an "independent calling". In time
this analysis gave way to the application of the rule of thumb known as the "control
test". Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 P.2d 1027, 1029-1045 (1940) ;
Wolfe, Determinations of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social Legislation,
41 COL. L. REv. 1015, 1022 (1941). See also Asia, Employment Relation: Common
Law Concepts and Legislative Definition, 55 YALE L.J. 76, 77 (1945).
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PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES

There are two practical consequences that flow from these conclusions. First, the Internal Revenue Service should feel under no
compulsion to persist in the sham reliance in its rulings on the control
test even when the result reached clearly is inconsistent therewith.
Nothing in the statute, the Supreme Court interpretations thereof or
the regulations requires it. A more flexible approach is called for in
the rulings and is consistent with proper interpretations of the statute
and cases. Second, the Supreme Court should clarify the disagreement
among the circuits as to the applicable test by indicating that the proper
approach is substantially the same as that of Judge Clark in the
Ringling case, the majority of the circuits to the contrary notwithstanding.

